The Moral Foundations Theory & Intuitive Judgment Link in Forming Moral Judgments

A University of Melbourne APA Lab Report Assignment

Under the 2nd-Year Psychology subject "Personality & Social Psychology"

Passed with High Distinction (H1)

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By Benjamin L., written during Semester 2, 2012

Abstract

            Recent research suggests that emotions influence moral judgments (the emotion-judgment link), and violating certain moral foundations induces specific corresponding emotions (the foundation-emotion link). This study tested the emotion-judgment link by comparing trait anger (TA) and disgust propensity (DP) measures with utilitarian judgments in a footbridge-type personal moral dilemma. Results revealed a significant negative correlation between utilitarian responses and DP, but not TA. This suggests that only disgust is relevant when forming moral judgments in such dilemmas. This study also examined the construct validity of Haidt and Graham’s (2007) moral foundations theory (MFT). If the MFT construct is valid, it should be consistent with previous research that associated anger and disgust with what the MFT would consider as violations of its Harm and Purity foundations. Results showed that Harm and Purity measures on the moral foundations questionnaire, the operationalised measure of the MFT, were respectively associated with TA and DP. This suggests that the MFT construct is valid and consistent with previous research. The present study further suggests that the foundation-emotion link and emotion-judgment link can be integrated into a more holistic, 3-stage ‘foundation-emotion-judgment’ model of moral psychology.

Tutor's Comments (B. Green):

This is good & very comprehensive but you need to include details of participants & state that the variables were measured with self-report questionnaires.

 The Moral Foundations Theory & Intuitive Judgment Link in Forming Moral Judgments

            Moral judgments evaluate others based on culturally-constructed values (Haidt, 2001). Although the role that emotions and rationality play in making these judgments is still debated, recent evidence suggests that emotions may be the dominant factor (Haidt, 2007) and violations of certain moral foundations elicit specific emotions (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). This study explores the link between moral foundations and emotions, as well as the link between emotions and moral judgments.

The Foundation-Emotion Link

            Moral judgments across cultures utilise three ontologically distinct ‘ethics’: community, autonomy, and divinity (Shweder, 1990). Community involves moral regulations that uphold social roles, autonomy involves moral regulations that uphold individual rights and choices, and divinity involves moral regulations governing the spiritually pure use of one’s body. In addition, Rozin et al. (1999) found that violating each ethic elicits specific emotions: community violations elicit contempt, autonomy violations elicit anger, and divinity violations elicit disgust. Haidt and Graham’s (2007) moral foundations theory (MFT) has corroborated and extended Shweder’s (1990) model into five psychologically rooted moral foundations that underlie each ethic. In the community ethic, the Ingroup/Loyalty foundation involves emotions regarding in-group member recognition, trust, and cooperation, while the Authority/Respect foundation involves emotions of respect, admiration, and awe towards authority. In the autonomy ethic, the Harm/Care foundation involves emotions of approval regarding the prevention or alleviation harm, while the Fairness/Reciprocity foundation involves emotions motivating reciprocal altruism. Finally, the divinity ethic is underpinned by the Purity/Sanctity foundation that encompasses emotions related to the use of the body (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

            Moral values across cultures (Graham et al., 2011) utilise one or more of these fundamentally affective foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007). However, while the emotions associated with Shweder’s (1990) ethics are well supported (Rozin et al., 1999; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011), the MFT was just operationalised as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ)(Graham et al., 2011). The MFQ gauges individuals’ sensitivity to violations of each foundation, but this has not been independently validated. If the MFT construct is a valid update and extension of Shweder’s (1990) ethics, the same emotions tied to each ethic should also be associated with their corresponding MFT foundation(s) on the MFQ.

The Emotion-Judgment Link

            Recent research has also emphasised the primacy of emotions in making moral judgments (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). For example, Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM) holds that moral judgments are directly produced by moral intuitions, defined as sudden, affectively-charged, moral judgments that occur without conscious prior deliberation. This “intuitive judgment link” (p.818, Haidt, 2001) stems from a largely unconscious collection of interconnected moral concepts that are rooted in our physical experiences and, in turn, become metaphorically extended into moral codes as a form of ‘embodied cognition’. For example, the contamination of pure substances underpins moral codes regarding bodily purity and sexual conduct (Haidt, 2001).

            Moral intuitions reliably occur in personal moral dilemmas (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, Cohen, 2004). These scenarios portray a conflict between two moral principles (Monin et al., 2007) and a involves “ME HURT YOU” formula (p.389, Greene et al., 2004), where ME (the agent) causes serious bodily HURT to YOU (another individual), in a way that does not simply deflect an imminent existing threat onto someone else. One paradigm with this formula is the footbridge dilemma: a runaway trolley is hurtling towards 5 workmen on the track and will kill them. The agent stands on a footbridge across the tracks and the only way to save them is to push a large stranger into the trolley’s path to stop it, but he would die in saving the others (Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). Pushing the stranger, a ME HURT YOU action, is a utilitarian response that promotes the ‘greater good’. Not pushing the stranger is a deontological response that respects certain moral rights and duties irrespective of the consequences (Greene et al., 2004). These responses could be associated with moral intuitions that stem from individual emotional dispositions. For instance, individuals who frequently experience disgust have high disgust propensity (DP) and generally shun utilitarian judgments in favour of deontological responses (Choe & Min, 2011). The same study also found significant relationships between footbridge responses and other emotional measures like trait anger (TA), which measures how frequently individuals experience anger. However, studies exploring these emotions in relation to such personal moral dilemmas are few and far between. To enhance our understanding of the emotion-judgment link, we must ask if certain emotions like anger and disgust lead individuals to favour certain moral judgments in these dilemmas.

            Based on the literature reviewed, this study focuses on two relationships that require further examination. Firstly, this study examines the foundation-emotion relationship by exploring the construct validity of the MFT. If the MFT construct is valid, it is hypothesised that TA will be positively correlated with harm sensitivity on the MFQ and, also, that DP will be positively correlated with purity sensitivity on the MFQ. Secondly, this study examines the emotion-judgment link and hypothesises that both DP and TA will be negatively correlated with utilitarian responses for the personal dilemma.

Method

Participants

            Five hundred and ninety-six undergraduates (151 males and 445 females) participated in this study as part of a psychology subject at the University of Melbourne. Participants were aged between 18 to 68 years old with a mean of 22.42 years (SD = 6.40).

Materials

            The moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ) measured participants’ sensitivity to infringements of each moral foundation (MFQ) (Graham et al., 2011). The MFQ was decomposed into five subscales, one for each foundation, and each subscale contained 3 items (e.g. for purity, “Chastity is an important and valuable virtue”). Responses were plotted on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, to 6 = strongly agree. Scores within each subscale were averaged to create a summary score, and higher scores reflect a greater sensitivity towards violations of that foundation.

            The frequency with which participants experienced disgust was measured with the 8-item Disgust Propensity (DP) subscale of the broader Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale-Revised (Olatunji, Cisler, Deacon, Connolly, & Lohr, 2007). Responses (e.g. “I experience disgust”) were made on 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = never, to 5 = always. Scores were averaged to create a summary score where higher scores indicated greater disgust frequency.

            The frequency with which participants experienced anger was measured with the 10-item Trait Anger (TA) subscale from the broader State-Trait Anger Scale (Forgays, Forgays, & Spielberger, 1997). Item responses (e.g. “I have a fiery temper”) were made on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = almost never, to 4 = almost always. Scores were averaged to create a summary score where higher scores indicated greater anger frequency.

            The footbridge dilemma (Moore et al., 2008) was used as the personal moral dilemma. Participants read a description of the situation and rated the acceptability of the utilitarian response (“how morally acceptable is pushing this stranger onto the tracks to save the five workmen?”) on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = absolutely unacceptable, to 6 = absolutely acceptable. Higher scores indicated acceptance of the utilitarian response, while lower scores indicated that they preferred the deontological response instead.

Procedure

            Before their tutorial, participants were told that this study was part of a larger study in moral psychology. These materials, among others, were presented using individual computers in a classroom and participants answered the items at their own time. Upon completion, the tutor collectively debriefed the class.

Results

            Bivariate associations between measures were tested with Spearman’s correlations. Table 1 below summarises the mean, standard deviation, and correlations between these measures.

Table 1.

	Mean	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Trait Anger	1.87	.44
2. Disgust Propensity	2.74	.51	.24**
3. MFQ Harm	4.62	.85	-.12**	.07
4. MFQ Purity	3.50	1.11	.02	.21**	.26**
5. Utilitarian Response Acceptability	2.46	1.36	.02	-.09*	-.20**	-.22**

           Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and Spearman's correlations between all measures.

                         Two-tailed; *p < .05; **p < .01

            Table 1 shows a significant positive correlation between DP and the purity measure on the MFQ (r = .21, df = 594, p = < .01). There is also a significant negative correlation between DP and utilitarian responses for the personal dilemma (r = -.09, df = 594, p = < .05). In addition, TA has a significant negative correlation with harm sensitivity on the MFQ (r = -.12, df = 594, p = < .01). However, the positive correlation between TA and utilitarian responses was not significant (r = .02, df = 594, p = >.05).

            Interestingly, there is also a significant negative correlation between harm sensitivity on the MFQ and utilitarian responses (r = -.20, df = 594, p = < .01), as well as a significant negative correlation between purity sensitivity on the MFQ and utilitarian responses (r = -.22, df = 594, p = < .01).

Discussion

The Foundation-Emotion Link

            Results support the hypotheses that disgust propensity (DP) will be positively correlated with purity sensitivity on the MFQ and trait anger (TA) would be positively correlated with harm sensitivity on the MFQ. Previous research tied Shweder’s (1990) three ethics to specific emotions: contempt to ‘community’, anger to ‘autonomy’, and disgust to ‘divinity’ (Rozin et al., 1999; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). The MFT further expanded Community into Ingroup/Loyalty and Authority/Respect, autonomy into Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity, and divinity into Purity (Haidt & Graham, 2007). If the MFT construct is a valid extension of Shweder’s ethics, the same emotions tied to each ethic should also be associated with their corresponding foundations, as measured by the moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ). This study provides preliminary support for the construct validity of the MFT by establishing a significant positive correlation between DP and TA and their corresponding foundations of purity and harm.

The Emotion-Judgment Link

            Results also support the hypothesis that DP will be negatively correlated with utilitarian responses for the personal moral dilemma. However, the hypothesis that TA will be negatively correlated with utilitarian responses is not supported. One explanation involves Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), which postulates an “intuitive judgement link” where moral intuitions directly produce moral judgments. These intuitions reliably occur in personal moral dilemmas like the footbridge scenario (Greene et al., 2004) and it is possible that individuals with high DP avoid utilitarian responses because it induces an aversive emotion (disgust) that leads to its rejection (Choe & Min, 2011). In social intuitionist terms, disgust may feed into a moral intuition that produces a moral judgement against the utilitarian option. This disgust may be a form of ‘embodied cognition’, where previous physical experiences are metaphorically extended into moral codes that underpin moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001). In the footbridge example, the ME HURT YOU action could involve ‘blood on one’s hands’ or the sinful taint of murder. However, there was no significant relationship between TA and footbridge responses, suggesting that TA may not be significant when making moral judgments in personal dilemmas.

Limitations and Future Research

            While the emotions tied to the foundations of Harm and Purity have been validated, the emotions tied to the remaining three domains should also be ascertained before the MFT can claim full construct validity. Future research could also examine if other potentially relevant emotions like guilt and sympathy are involved and, if so, whether they complement or compete with contempt, anger, and disgust in forming moral judgments.

            Also, this study explored the foundation-emotion and emotion-judgment links as separate rather than inter-connected relationships. However, a more holistic approach would integrate both links into a three-stage, ‘foundation-emotion-judgment’ model that establishes a relationship between violations of a foundation, the emotion(s) or moral intuitions it induces, and moral judgment(s) that result. This seems plausible given the significant negative correlation between utilitarian responses and MFQ measures of harm and disgust that was noted in the results above. Future research could examine if utilitarian responses are rejected because they violate these foundations and induce moral intuitions that rule against them.

Conclusion

            In conclusion, this study builds on the literature regarding the foundation-emotion link and the emotion-judgment link. In the former, findings support the construct validity of Haidt and Graham’s (2007) moral foundations theory, specifically the foundations of harm and purity. As for the latter, results suggest that disgust, but not anger, is intuitively linked to the rejection of utilitarian responses in personal moral dilemmas. Future research could extend these findings into a more comprehensive test of the emotions tied to each moral foundation and connect them to moral judgments in a three-stage ‘foundation-emotion-judgment’ process.

References

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Forgays, D.G., Forgays, D.K., & Spielberger, C.D. (1997). Factor structure of the state-trait anger expression inventory, Journal of Personality Assessment, 69 (3), 497-507.

Graham, J., Nosek, B.A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto., P.H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101 (2), 366-385.

Greene, J.D., Nystrom, L.E., Engell, A.D., Darley, J.M., & Cohen, J.D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment, Neuron, 44, 389-400.

Haidt, J. (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment, Psychological Review, 108 (4), 814-834.

Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology, Science, 316, 998-1002.

Haidt, J. & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize, Social Justice Research, 20 (1), 98-116.

Horberg, E.J., Oveis, C., Keltner, D., & Cohen, A.B. (2009). Disgust and the moralization of purity, Jounral of Personality and Social Psychology, 97 (6), 963-976.

Monin, B. & Pizarro, D.A. (2007). Deciding versus reacting: Conceptions of moral judgment and the reason-affect debate, Review of General Psychology, 11 (2), 99-111.

Moore, A.B., Clark, A.B., & Kane, M.J. (2008). Who shalt not kill? Individual differences in working memory capacity, executive control, and moral judgment, Psychological Science, 19 (6), 549-557.

Olatunji, B.O., Cisler, J.M., Deacon, B.J., Connolly, K., & Lohr, J.M. (2007). The disgust propensity and sensitivity scale-revised: Psychometric properties and specificity in relation to anxiety disorder symptoms, Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21, 918-930.

Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76 (4), 574-586.

Russell, P.S. & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2011). Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality, Emotion, 11 (2), 233-240.

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