Psychological Epistemology

PSYCHOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

In the early years of the 20th century, much thought has been devoted to social epistemology and what it means to call something a 'science'. Kuhn has noted that it follows certain distinct phases until a 'crisis point' has been reached and the scientific community comes to a 'paradigm shift' where a new theory that best accounts for phenomena comes to be accepted as truth. Foucault, too, has documented how knowledge in the human sciences can be mere expressions of social norms, such as the definition of insanity, which is nothing more than a measure of conformity. However, I believe that the individual aspect of knowledge deserves more attention for it is, ultimately, collective individual decisions that shape disciplines and psychological epistemology thus deserves equal attention.

EXPERIMENTAL BIAS

The experiment lies at the heart of many sciences, both natural, social and psychological. It is the primary test for 'truth', the claim to positivism that forms the basis of all knowledge. Francis Bacon was the first to espouse the experimental scientific method. He believed that natural causal relations will become evident when we collect sufficient data and the testing of these relations via experiments would establish their truth-value. This Baconian empiricism remained at the heart of science until Karl Popper demonstrated its logical flaw.

Since experiments establish truth with corroborating experimental results, it is essentially inductive because experiments have to be held under certain controlled conditions to test the influence of various factors in multiple scenarios. As more corroborative data is collected, the theory gains greater recognition and credibility. However, it is one thing to say "X-number of swans are white" and another to say that "all swans are white". The former statement refers to a particular sample size and the latter generalises it into a universal statement, but the history of science has shown the precariousness of such leaps of logic - the discovery of black swans notwithstanding. For example, the model of the atom has progressed from the 'Plum Pudding' model to Dalton's, Bohr's and finally an elliptical version of Bohr's model today. It demonstrates that the experimental method can be far from indubitable. This is why Popper postulated that falsification, rather than experimentation, be the yardstick for science. Falsification holds that scientific statements are those open to potential empirical falsification - this holds all knowledge to be tentative and remains credible until proven otherwise. Granted, such an approach does not constitute a material change in the situation because we are turning the problem of ascertaining truth on its head but what it does do is weed out conceited beliefs about our knowledge.

The fact that experiments were seen as the test of truth for centuries prior to Popper does seem to suggest that knowledge is contingent upon the psychological justification of belief rather than the justification of absolute Truth. By deconstructing the logical flaws of Bacon's experimental process, Popper has inadvertently demonstrated that the human mind can and has focused more on assuaging its own doubts as it attempts to approach true knowledge when it should, ideally, approach true knowledge in order to assuage doubts.

CAUSAL FALLACIES

Popper's argument appears cogent prima facie, but it too holds one precarious assumption. Scientific knowledge is built on deterministic causal principles, the belief that one thing inevitably causes another. While the Uncertainty Principle has recently proven that probability is, in theory, the only possible mode of explanation, it too rests on causal principles at the atomic level and beyond. However, this pervasive notion of causality is contestable because it seems to be a psychological illusion rather than a universal explanatory concept.

Hume has noted that neither experience nor rational analysis can establish necessary causal relations beyond mathematics. In the empirical world, all we have is constant conjunction where objects that are thought to be causal are merely contiguous in time and space. It is a case of correlations so constant that we come to think of them according to a causal process. What we have is an expectation that something will follow another according because one causes the other, an expectation that is analogous to Pavlov's Dog where the Dog is fed every time it hears a bell and gradually comes to expect food whenever the bell is rung. In this regard, the entire structure of science is thus fallaciously based on the dubious psychological conviction of inevitable causation.

NO SURPRISE?

These conclusions about establishing truth and the logical fallacies behind them should not come as a surprise. We must remember that knowledge of the world is not obtained through the collection of observations but rather our attempts to explain them. This can only be done through human mental faculties for explanations are essentially the structural construction of abstract ideas. While this apparatus is far from ideal according to epistemological standards, its flaws are necessary evils for our mind is the only tool of understanding we have. In the end, the best palliative treatment for these epistemological ills is the logical deconstruction of our methods and the thinking behind them. Hume and Popper's arguments highlight the danger of conceit, and I hope we may reach a new level of understanding by following their legacy.

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