Search Box

Monday, February 8, 2010

'Chess Game' Perspective of Language





A CHESS GAME PERSPECTIVE OF LANGUAGE

Language is a system of codes and the rules governing these codes. It is a fundamental system used in everyday life for communication, understanding and building relationships. Wittgenstein has advanced certain ideas about the nature of language and I feel that some of these postulates can actually be configured into a teleological or ‘goal-oriented’ understanding of human communication behavior. We can view the practice of language as a chess game that we use to achieve certain desired ends.



One founding principle of Wittgenstein’s linguistic philosophy is the picture theory of meaning. In this theory, he states that the meaning of nouns, verbs, adverbs and adjectives cannot be explained through words alone. Instead, one has to be shown a ‘picture’ of the object referred to. For example, it would be difficult for someone who has never seen a computer to understand what it is unless he is shown how it looks like and operates. Comprehensive descriptions of the shape, size, color and functions of a computer would be ineffective because the complex configuration of these qualities and how it forms the object may still be confusing after a copious amount of description but a simple demonstration would immediately create understanding.

These ‘picture-words’ are analogous to chess pieces. They are governed by specific rules of use or grammar that facilitates understanding between individuals, much like how we understand how a rook and pawn fits into the overall game of chess because we understand how they are used. However, the chess-game analogy is incomplete because words are not used pointlessly. Instead, they are used in practice to achieve certain ends in the social sphere.


This leads us to Wittgenstein’s second account of language as a ‘speech-act’ where an utterance is itself an act. For instance, for a pastor to say “I now pronounce you husband and wife” is not merely a descriptive statement but an act in itself recognizing and legitimizing a matrimonial union. It is a social phenomenon expressed in linguistic terms. Similar speech-acts occur when a promise is made, an accusation is charged and a declaration signed. It is important to understand that these speech-acts need not be solely expressed in formal language systems. As long as the act is expressed in socially understandable terms, communication and meaning is possible. This accounts for the prevalence of colloquial language and the evolution of meaning that goes beyond formal systems of language for, as Wittgenstein puts it, “language is use”.

Going back to the analogy with chess, a speech-act is akin to making a move on a chessboard. An aggressive move is a signal of intent expressed with the language of the chess pieces, much like how a speech-act is made using ‘picture-words’. These actions are executed with an end in mind.


While a chess game may be adversarial in nature, speech-acts can also be cooperative or inquisitive. It, however, is made with a certain intent and purpose. For example, the matrimonial statement mentioned earlier is made with the intent and purpose of legitimizing a union. Other examples include questions, propositional statements or arguments such as “How do I repair this?” “We should sign this treaty” or “A change in pressure causes a change in boiling point”. It is important to realize that we have diverse goals when we use language and these may not always be explicit. A heart-felt account of a tragic experience to a friend, for instance, may function as a tacit attempt to illicit compassion and sympathy instead of a mere description of events. It is also important to realize that the practice of language in this manner need not be confined to a verbal vocabulary: a soldier’s salute or a married man’s wedding ring both function as a ‘social vocabulary’ indicating a particular social status – the salute acknowledging an officer of superior status and the ring signifying his social status as a married man.

The issue of symbolic meaning brings us to another issue: the underlying social norms behind symbolic language that enhances it’s meaning. In the case of the married man, the ring itself indicates that he is married and social customs frown upon anyone else making a romantic proposition to him. The ‘vocabulary’ of the ring functions as a symbol of his social status and the rules governing some of his social relations. By wearing the ring, he is making a declaration or ‘speech-act’ – or perhaps ‘act-speech’ – that publicly communicates his position to others indicating his commitment to his spouse (or so we hope). As we can see, language as communication rests upon and gains meaning from the social norms governing its use, much like how a chess game follows certain rule-sets of behavior with entailing penalties for infringement. We use this language to communicate our intent, position or desires in explicit, tacit, verbal or symbolic form or any combination thereof.


Limitations of the Picture-Meaning & Speech-Act Accounts

In all honesty, this ‘Chess Game’ theory of language is incomplete on several fronts. The picture-theory of meaning and notion of a readily understood speech-act are far from perfect. Empirical data and rational analysis both demonstrate that these two accounts of language are statements that describe tendencies rather than universal linguistic practices. Their problems will ultimately compromise the Chess Game perspective because communication is no longer ubiquitously understood.

Firstly, the ‘Chess Game’ perspective is based upon the picture-theory of meaning that fails to account for many linguistic practices. The picture-theory assumes that it is possible to confirm a word’s meaning by recourse to referents outside language. Such a positivistic stance is problematic because there are certain aspects of experience that cannot be publicly ‘pictured’. This is especially true of sentimental expressions such as ‘love’, ‘beauty’ and ‘happiness’. These are often expressed through external indicators such as a smile and we assume that we know the underlying emotion through ‘backwards inference’. Such an approach assumes that we already have a personal, private understanding of the said emotion but it this can be misleading. For example, if we were to follow the picture-theory to the letter, we would not expect a young adolescent to fully comprehend sexual jealousy in a way that a man in Othello’s position would, nor would we understand concepts like Truth or justice because these are abstract ideas that have no corporeal manifestation – yet we do understand them to varying extents.

Secondly, the picture-theory of meaning also fails to account for metaphorical communication and figurative speech. Common metaphors and similes are often used to describe certain states of affairs. For instance, the phrase “sour grapes” is used to describe someone who unreasonably disparages something he desires simply because he cannot obtain it. However, it is ludicrous to think this figure of speech gains it meaning from tasting sour grapes because the meaning is conceptual in nature. It is instead grounded in Aesop’s parables and the effective use of this phrase in communication necessitates that both conversing parties understand the relevant referent.


These problems of meaning with the picture-theory of language have detrimental consequences for speech-acts in certain contexts. Since words do not always have a clear or comprehensible meaning, speech-acts that utilize them may fail to achieve effective communication and, indeed, have been shown to create disastrous miscommunication and misunderstanding.

The severity of these consequences are readily seen in the historical period known as the Cold War. During this period, the US/NATO and USSR/Warsaw factions steadily built up defensive contingency armaments and military alliances against the other. What was not clearly understood at the time was that both sides practiced this ‘posturing equilibrium’ only because the defensive moves on one side was viewed as an aggressive preparation by the other. In fact, the height of the Cold War – the Cuban Missile Crisis – was caused because the NATO shipment of nuclear missiles to Turkey on the Soviet border was counter-poised by the placement of Russian missiles on Cuba off the coast of the USA. Each side intended to use these missiles as a symbolic ‘signal’ that it was prepared to defend its smaller ally but the other camp interpreted this as a threat and the launching of which required, in President Kennedy’s words, “a full retaliatory response”. Neither side desired a standoff but the cautious interpretations of their opponent’s posturing language produced that very consequence anyway. It is a case of linguistic ‘speech-acts’ gone disastrously wrong and the ‘chess game’ of posturing begins to lose its clarity of meaning.


The Chess Game Perspective: Checkmate?

The aforementioned problems have severe implications on the Chess Game perspective of language. For one, the goal-directed Chess Game perspective can only account for an individual’s intent in employing certain linguistic words or symbols but this does not mean that the receiving party will attain complete understanding of these signals. Flirtatious young men and women will find this troubling, as will educators that seek to convey abstract ideas to students or politicians attempting to second-guess another party’s maneuvers. If our signals are not clearly understood, they will no longer function as an effective medium of communication for if indeed “language is use”, as Wittgenstein puts it, then a portion of our language becomes obsolete because its utility has been compromised.

However, this does not mean the Chess Game perspective is hollow. At the very least, in highlights the intent behind every linguistic expression and how meaning is created by not just what is said (i.e. the words and symbols) but also how the expression is formed and the circumstances around it. Also important is the role that social norms have to play in creating linguistic meaning for the practice of language is essentially a social operation for communication. While miscommunication is possible nevertheless, the clarification of meaning would have to rest on the communicants’ will to achieve mutual understanding and, indeed, humanity’s drive for social bonds.


[picture from http://blog.mlive.com/fireupchips/2009/03/large_chess.jpeg]

0 comments: